The so called, Rabin "paradox" is a proof that a given signature system, which is secure under ciphertext only attack is insecure under chosen message attack. The construction that is used to prove the first clause is also used to prove the second. For several years it was believed to be inherent to public key signature systems. A similar problem existed for public key cryptosystems (under chosen ciphertext attack). Trap-door functions were inherent in the construction of the "paradox."
Introduction
Consider 2-party Key Distribution Systems (KDS) with one transmission in each direction (party i transmits ?%); these transmissions are independent of the private secret keys (and therefore, these systems are zero-knowledge as far as the private secret keys are concerned). The transmissions may be the results of computations Ti = Fi(ei) , where the functions F{ may be one-way, and e^ is randomly chosen. Let B,, denote the cracking problem of a given KDS, under Ciphertext-Only at- Let Bkkp denote the cracking problem (of the same system), under Know (old session ) Key Attack, by a Passive adversary, i.e.
Bk+: Input: X , T~, T~, T~, T~, I E '
= g ( X , r i , r i ) ; Output: k = ~( X , T~, T~) . ( T ; , T ; ,~' ) are efficiently computable given only the public data X . Using this we present a simple, secure, non "paradoxical" KDS. This system, and several of our "paradoxical" systems appeared in [MTI] . However, the!; do not mention the "paradox," and no formal definition of security is given.
The main results
Let problems A, BcT, Bkkp be as defined above. (ii) The public data, X , of Bkkp is identical to that of A ( I = X) and BcV, and function Gz, s.t. A ( X ) = G2 (X,e:,eB,k') . Hence Bkkp is efficiently solvable using k = G ( X , T~,Tz,(,T;, k', G ( X , Fcl(~i), F;'(T;),~')).
if given X , arbitrary triples ( T ; , T:, k') are polynomially computable, then Bkkp and B,, are of the same complexity. A system with the above property does not have the "paradox." We later show such a KDS.
Example of a "paradoxical" system
The system is a slight modification of a system shown in [YS] . It belongs to the Diffie-Hellman family of KDS, which relies on the difficulty of the discrete-log prob- The initial cracking problem (before any communication) is not solvable, since there isn't enough information to determine even one bit of the key. The communication is completely independent of the secrets, so it does not provide any additional information on the secret keys (s; and s,). This proves Lemma 1. mod m ) , can be easily comnput,ed, hence they don't contribute any new knowledge, and B k k p is as hard to solve as BcT, for this system.
In general a protocol is assumed resilient if a disruptive adversary cannot bring the honest participants to assume a wrong outcome after executing the protocol. To end up with a practical protocol we have to impose some reasonable restrictions on this definition. Therefore, we address the following disruptive adversary: The adversary is a.n impersonator, playing in the middle, between i and j , pretending to be j when talking to i, and vice-versa. He tries to establish a session-key with each of the 1egitima.te parties (not necessa.rily the same key). In doing so he may deviate from the original protocol by sending messages, computed entirely different from the intended computations (as long as his computations are done in probabilistic polynomial time). However. he must conform with the basic structure of the protocol, i.e. send messages of the right structure and size, when expected.
We can reduce the basic Diffie-Hellman problem to the cracking problem under impersonatioii attack, with known old session's information. Since old information can be reproduced by anybody easily, we ca.n remo\'e this obsta.cle and concentrate on a retluctioii to the crackiiig 111.obleni wit.liout that hist.or!.. Again, the DII probleln Triples ( T ; , T ; ,~' z (aa2)'' .
Resilience:
is Input: a, a=, d , N ; Output: a f Y mod N .
The cracking problem for impersonator who plays in the middle, trying to impersonate j when talking to i (for example) should be defined in general terms, that is, we cannot assume that all he does is choosing some Rj instead of Rj, but otherwise participates in the protocol as originally designed. We assume that the impersonator picks some Rj, and sends h(a, gj) to i, where h(., .) is any probabilistic polynomial time function.
This function may have more inputs; Any public information can be part of its input.
So the cracking problem of the impersonator is defined as follows: Input: a,N,aR.,P; E as' mod N,Pj E asJ,h(a,Rj);
Output: h(a, gj)" . 
